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Abstract
This paper provides a unified theory to explain the onset of the finan-
cial crisis in 1998 and the striking economic recovery in Russia and
the former Soviet Union afterwards. Before the crisis, the banking
sector in these economies was stuck in a development trap in which
the banking sector is separated from the real sector of the economy.
The separation between the two sectors arises due to a lemons lending
market and due to a large government budget. In a lemons credit
market firms may find it cheaper to raise liquidity through non-bank
finance (trade credits from other firms) rather than through bank fi-
nance. As a result non-bank finance may generate an externality on
the lending rates of banks. In equilibrium most firms in the economy
rely on non-bank finance and the financial sector focuses on trading
government securities. The collapse of the treasury bills market in
Russia in the financial crisis of 1998 reversed this process and thus
acted as a trigger to pull the economy out of the trap. This has led
to the strong economic recovery and provided initial conditions for
banking development. Empirical evidence with firm level data from
Ukraine in 1997 and with country level data for transition economies
support the model’s predictions.
JEL Classification: G3, G21, P34, O16, D82
Keywords: banking development, institutional trap, trade credit, non-
bank finance, finance in emerging market economies
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1. Introduction
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and the other CIS countries took
a bumpy road in their transition to a market economy. The real sector of the
economy experienced a sharp contraction. Output collapsed to around 50 percent
of its 1989 level in 1998 (see Table 1). During this period the real sector accumu-
lated huge outstanding debt with money as a medium of exchange vanishing. As
a result arrears and non-cash payments have become a dominant feature of the
Russian economy. Total payables to the enterprise sector exploded from around 20
percent of GDP in 1994 to over 70 percent of GDP in 1998, while total receivables
rose from 20 percent of GDP to about 45 percent of GDP over the same period.
Barter and non-cash payments started to rise after macroeconomic stabilization
in 1994 from 8 percent to over 50 percent of sales in 1998 (see Figure 1).
In contrast to the contraction of the real sector the Russian financial sector
experienced an explosive growth in the number of commercial banks from fewer
than 100 banks in 1988 to about 2400 banks in 1994 to about 1500 banks in 1998.
Despite these large numbers of banks, the Russian banking sector is highly concen-
trated. In 1997, the top five banks accounted for 36 percent of total assets and the
top 50 banks for 71 percent. About three quarters of all household deposits were
maintained with Sberbank. Despite this boom in the financial sector, the Russian
banking sector allocated very little credit to the real sector of the economy. Rubel
loans (in nominal terms) to the economy declined by 31.7 percent from 180 billion
ruble to 123 billion ruble between 1997 and 1998. In real terms the decline in bank
credit to the economy was almost 60 percent. Commercial banks lending rates
increased in nominal terms during this period (see Table 2). Due to high yields
in the treasury bills market commercial banks concentrated their activity on this
market. The share of federal government securities in commercial banks portfolios
increased to almost three quarters of ruble deposit liabilities by the end of 1997.1
A similar picture emerges for other countries of the former Soviet Union notably
Ukraine (see Table 3). In fact, Russia and Ukraine are the transition countries
who suffer most from an under-provision of bank intermediation, particularly in
mobilising savings and in allocating credit to the private sector. Besides the rela-
tive low scale of banking, Russia and Ukraine experienced a continued decline in
the scale of banking activity over time. The ratio of credit to the private sector
1see OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation 1997, Paris 1997-1998.
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to GDP declined from 12 percent in 1994 to 8 percent in 1997 in Russia and from
5 percent in 1994 to 2 percent in 1997 in Ukraine. This compares with an average
for all the transition countries of 22 percent in 1994 to 23 percent in 1997.
Table 1
CIS Central Europe
Russia Poland
Ukraine Czech Republic
Azerbaijan Hungary
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Source: International Monetary Fund
Level of Real GDP
in selected Transition Countries in 1998
78
61
95
117
54
55
37
44
93
95
(1989 = 100)
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Table 2
total loans foreign currency ruble loans interest rates
1) inflation2)
1996 247 117 130 146,8 47,7
1997 310 130 180 32,0 14,7
1998 422 298 123 41,8 27,7
1999 597 304 293 39,7 85,7
2000 956 368 588 24,4 20,8
2001 1418 474 944 17,9 21,5
Source: International Monetary Fund, Central Bank of Russia
1)commercial banks´ 3-months lending rates in percent
2)consumer price index in percent
     Bank Credit to the Real Sector in Russia
                                  in billions of rubels
After the August financial crisis in 1998, however, the recovery of output
in Russia and Ukraine is much stronger than was expected. In fact, in 1999
Russia and Ukraine experienced positive growth for the first time since the fall of
communism. The IMF has adjusted its forecast in its World Economic Outlook
upwards several times. Output has grown in 1999 by 3.2 percent and in 2000 by
7.5 percent and is expected to grow by 4 percent in 2001 and 2002. Similarly,
in Ukraine output recovered to 5 percent in 2000 and GDP is expected to grow
by 6 and 9 percent in 2001 and 2002, respectively (see Figure 3). Total arrears
and barter have started to decline in Russia. In particular, barter and non-cash
payments dropped by 20 percent in 1999 and continue to decline in 2000 and 2001
(see Figure 1).2 Furthermore, commercial banks started to lend to the real sector.
Ruble loans to the economy more than doubled in nominal terms between 1998
and 1999 from 123 bill rubles to 293 bill rubles. At the same time lending rates
of commercial banks declined sharply in nominal as well as real terms (see Table
2 and Figure 1). Due to the collapse of the government treasury bills market,
2According to the interfax news agency the share of barter in sales dropped as well in Ukraine
from 33 percent in 1999 to 17 percent in 2000 to 8 percent in 2001.
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the large exposure of portfolios of commercial banks to this market made many
banks insolvent. This has led to a further consolidation and concentration in the
banking sector with 3 state banks (of which one is Sberbank) now accounting for
about 80 percent of the assets. Moreover, Sberbank started to aggressively enter
the lending market pushing some of the existing top banks out of this market.3
A similar picture emerges for Ukraine where bank credit to the private sector
increased from 2 percent to 9 percent of GDP between 1997 and 1999 (see Table
3 and Figure 1).
Table 3
1994 1996 1997 1999
Azerbaijan - 1 - 3
Belarus 18 7 9 10
Kazakhstan 25 6 5 9
Latvia 16 7 11 -
Lithuania 18 11 10 10
Russia 12 7 8 12
Ukraine 5 1 2 9
Czech Republic 40 57 68 44
Hungary 26 22 24 21
Poland 12 16 18 19
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics
Credit to the Private Sector in Transition Countries
in percent of GDP
3For the restructuring of the Russian banking sector after the crisis, see Interfax Center for
Economic Analysis, Russia‘s Largest Banks in 1999, Moscow 1999.
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These developments are quite puzzling for several reasons. First, when macroe-
conomic stabilization was in place in Russia in 1994 arrears and barter started
to explode. Thus, the non-cash economy in Russia does not appear to be a phe-
nomenon of hyperinflation. Second, with the outbreak of the financial crisis in
1998 arrears and barter started to decline. This is not what one typically expects
from a financial crisis. Third, with the outbreak of the financial crisis GDP in
Russia and Ukraine recovers for the first time since the fall of communism. This
stands in contrast to the experience of the Asian economies where the financial
crisis led to a sharp output decline in many of these economies.4
The described developments in Russia and Ukraine raise the question whether
there is a connection between these observations. More specifically, what explains
the separation between the financial and the real sector? What is the relationship
between the non-cash economy on the one hand and the development of the bank-
ing sector on the other? Has the stronger than expected recovery of the Russian
and Ukrainian economies after the financial crisis in 1998 something to do with
the fact that barter trade is declining and that the banking sector has started to
provide finance to the real sector of the economy? What role played the financial
crisis in this process?
We explore these questions based on a model which provides a link between
the non-cash economy in Russia and the failure of the banking sector. We take
the possibility for barter trade as given and focus in this paper on endogenizing
the banking failure. 5 We ask in this paper whether trade credits and barter
trade can create a banking failure and thus can prevent the banking sector from
developing as a financial institution. Given the difficulty for banks to distinguish
good from bad debtors, banks charge high lending rates for loans to cover the risk.
This, in turn, induces good quality firms to turn to trade credits and barter trade
to solve their liquidity needs. The option for firms to raise liquidity through non-
bank finance drives up banks lending rates. In equilibrium banks give loans to a
4Based on a sample of 195 crisis episodes across 91 developing countries, Gupta, Mishra,
Sahay (2001) find in their study on ouput responses to financial crisis that around 60 percent of
the crisis have been contractionary. Moreoever, Loayza and Ranciere (2001) find in the countries
that experience a fall in output after crisis, that it takes on average 4 years for output to recover.
5In a recent paper Marin and Schnitzer (1999) argue that barter is a response to a banking
failure. Barter is a trade credit between firms which is repaid in goods rather than cash. Marin
and Schnitzer take the banking failure as given and argue that barter offers a deal-specific
collateral which effectively lowers credit enforcement costs.
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small number of bad quality firms while the good quality firms turn to non-bank
finance. The banking sector instead focuses on trading government securities. As
a result the financial sector is separated from the real sector of the economy. The
separating equilibrium features a trap in which non-bank finance hinders banking
sector development. Based on data from a survey among firms in Ukraine in
1997, we test the predictions of the model and we indeed find that bank loans are
allocated to firms with low quality.
Our theory offers an explanation for why a financial crisis may be beneficial
and has helped the Russian economy to pull out of the trap of banking failure.
Thus, our model helps to explain why the recovery in Russia after the August
1998 crisis was stronger than expected. We argue that the financial sector has
been disconnected from the real sector because the Russian government has been
over issuing bonds to finance the budget deficit when tax collection turned out
to be difficult. The government offered exceptionally high yields on treasury bills
which gave banks an incentive to finance the governments budget and to invest
their assets in this market rather than to invest in the real sector.6 The crisis was
triggered when the government defaulted on its debt and the securities market
collapsed. Rather than leading to a total collapse of the banking sector (due to its
large exposure to this market) the vanished market for government bonds induces
banks to reallocate their assets to the real sector. Banks start to lower interest
rates to attract firms to borrow. Lower lending rates, in turn, induces some better
quality firms to start to borrow from banks rather than to engage in non-bank
finance and barter. This, in turn, further lowers interest rates and induces more
firms to switch from barter to borrowing from banks. This way, the financial
crisis has provided an opportunity for the banking sector to develop. Our theory
is able to account for the puzzling fact that after the crisis of 1998 the non-cash
economy started to decline in Russia and Ukraine and the banking sector started
to lend to the real sector and interest rates declined sharply. 7 Based on data for
20 transition countries we test the prediction of the financial crisis as a trigger for
6According to Shleifer and Treisman (2000) this was the price Russia had to pay to achieve
stabilization of inflation. Rather than printing money to finance the budget, the government
issued treasury bills and maintained artificially high interest rates on these bills to co-opt the
banks who havily invested in this market. Yields on the GKO market reached up to 60 percent
(see Figure 1).
7During the crisis the ruble depreciated by more then fifty percent (see Figure 3) which may
be an alternative explanation for why barter dropped after the August crisis in Russia. The
devaluation of the ruble may have made Russian exports relatively inexpensive in international
markets which may have earned Russian firms some cash in these markets. The exchange rate
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bank development. We show that the allocation of bank credit to the real sector
of the economy is indeed hampered by the governments’ overissuing of bonds and
by the opportunity for firms to engage in barter trade.
Our theory suggests a link between the governments budget deficit and the
non-cash economy which has been overlooked so far. In our model, the gov-
ernment’s public debt creates the non-cash economy rather than the other way
around. It is frequently argued that arrears and barter in Russia and Ukraine
are driven by tax motives. By allowing to hide some of their profits lowering
their tax base, non-bank finance is seen to contribute to the difficulty of raising
taxes and thus causing the governments budget to explode. Our theory instead
suggests that the governments’ budget deficit is crowding out bank lending to
the real sector by creating an environment in which banks invest in the treasury
bills market with exceptionally high returns. As a result the real sector turns to
non-bank finance to meet its liquidity needs.8
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop a model of the bank-
firm relationship as a lemons market. In section 3 we characterize the equilibrium
of a banking lemons market in which the financial and the real sector is separated.
Section 4 describes how the financial crisis has helped the economies of the former
Soviet Union to get out of the banking failure trap. In section 5 we test the
predictions of the model with firm level data from Ukraine and with country level
data for 20 transition economies. Section 6 concludes.
induced creation of liquidity may have helped firms to meet some of their liquidity needs with
internal cash flow rather than through barter. However, Ukraine experienced a sharp drop in
barter and arrears after 1998 as well with a mild depreciation of the exchange rate only which
suggests that some other force is at work here. A common argument that the return to the cash
economy in Russia is due to a reversal in capital flight after the August crisis does not seem to
be supported by the data. Westin (2000) and Loungani and Mauro (2000) argue, that capital
flight picked up again in Russia after the tightening of capital controls in the aftermath of the
crisis.
8In the debate over the non-cash economy tax reasons figure prominently as an explanation.
However, empiricial evidence for Russia and Ukraine suggests that tax motives have only minor
importance, while the lack of liquidity and high borrowing costs for bank loans are the prime
motivation for firms to engage in barter trade, see Commander and Mumssen (1999) for evidence
in Russia, and Marin, Kaufmann, Gorochowskij (2000) for evidence in Ukraine.
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2. Model
We consider an economy with M banks and N firms, where N > M ; and the
government.
Firms: firm i (i = 1, ..., N) has a probability of being solvent, λi, which is only
known by the firm. The quality level of firms can be ranked as λ1 > λ2 > ... > λN .
But the ranking of firms is not known to any particular bank and firm. The average
quality of all firms is λN = 1N
PN
i=1 λi, which is known to the firms and banks. The
liquidity demand of firms can be met through borrowing from banks or through
other means, such as borrowing from other firms in the form of trade credits in
cash or in the form of trade credits in goods (barter trade)9. We will call these
alternative forms of finance as non-bank-financing (NBF). To meet their liquidity
needs profit maximizing firms choose the cheaper way between bank financing and
NBF.
To simplify the analysis we assume that NBF cost b = const.10 Cost savings
when undertaking NBF may include avoiding hold-up as well as saving on taxes.
It has been argued that NBF may help to solve the problem of disorganization
in transition countries with weak contract enforcement. NBF can also be used to
hide profits and thus give firms the opportunity to evade taxes. The NBF costs b
are a reduced form capturing these possibilities.11
Government: We suppose that the government’s total revenue equals its tax
revenue plus its borrowing. Given the possibility for tax evasion, the government
is assumed not to be able to collect taxes effectively. For any given government
revenue, R, the lower the tax revenue, T , the more the government issues bonds
9Overdue trade credits in cash (firm arrears) and trade credits in goods (barter) exploded
in Russia and the former Soviet Union. Usually goods used in barter are not fixed assets and
heterogeneous in quality. This means that these goods are typically not collaterizable assets
for bank loans due to high cost of quality assessment or selling for banks. For barter as a
collateralized trade credit, see Marin and Schnitzer (2002).
10This assumption can easily be relaxed without changing the qualitative results. For example,
one could make b to depend on firm characteristics like the firm’s level of quality. However,
as will become clear later this would reinforce the separation result we will derive in the next
section without adding insight.
11For NBF as a solution to the hold-up problem and disorganization, see Marin and Schnitzer
(1999); for empirical evidence on NBF and tax evasion in the former Soviet Union, see Com-
mander and Mumssen (1999) and Marin, Kaufmann, Gorochowskij (2000).
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to finance its expenditures B = R−T . We assume that NBF firms evade taxes.12
When there are n NBF firms the tax revenue is reduced to T = (N − n) t, where
t is the tax paid by each firm. To borrow more, the yield of government bond, s,
has to be higher.13 To capture this idea in a simple way, we assume that the yields
of government bonds, s, is a positive linear function of the amount of borrowing.
When there is no tax evasion the interest rate of government securities reaches
its lower bound with s = φr0, where φ is the investors’ relative confidence in
government securities. When the relative confidence in government securities is
the same as that of investing in the private sector, then φ = 1; otherwise it is
φ > 1. To make things simple, we treat φ as a reduced form and take φ and t as
exogenously given.14
To summarize, we have,
s (n) = rφ
B (n)
B¯
= rφR− (N − n) t
R−Nt
where, B¯ is planned government borrowing; and B (n) is realized government
borrowing.
Bank-firm relationship: We assume free entry in the banking sector. Fac-
ing competition, each bank makes its investment decision considering expected
returns. If the expected return of investing in government securities is higher
than that of lending to a firm, banks will invest in government securities rather
than lend to firms.
We suppose that there is asymmetric information between banks and firms
such that banks are not able to identify which firm is of good quality and which
is of bad quality. Asymmetric information between banks and firms is a severe
problem in transition economies. Most banks in transition economies are new
and have very little experience with credit evaluation. Furthermore, the lack of
12Although in our model NBF is driven by financial considerations, NBF offers the possibility
of evading taxes. This conforms well with the empirical evidence for Russia and the former Soviet
Union, see Commander and Mumssen (1999) and Marin, Kaufmann, Gorochowskij (2000).
13The government can either issue government bond domestically with a high yield; or borrow
from foreign investors by issuing dollar denominated bonds and paying higher interest rates.
14Alternatively, φ may also be interpreted as a risk premium on government securities.
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accounting standards and market valuation of firms’ assets makes it difficult to
evaluate firms’ creditworthiness. The only information that banks are assumed to
have is the average quality of the firms in the economy, λN . Thus, banks’ ex ante
belief of the probability that a firm will be able to repay its loan is λN . Therefore,
banks’ expected rate of return of lending to firms is rN λ¯N , where rN is the rate of
repayment of a solvent firm when there are in total N firms borrowing. Comparing
the expected rate of return of lending to a firm and investing in government
securities, the arbitrage condition for a bank is
(1 + rN) λ¯N = 1 + s.
Or the rate that a bank will charge to a firm will be
rN = (1 + s)/λ¯N − 1.
Facing this rate, rN , a firm i with a probability of success of λi, will face an
expected marginal cost of borrowing from the bank of
λi(1 + rN) = (1 + s)
λi
λ¯
.
If raising liquidity through NBF is less costly than borrowing from banks, firm i
will borrow from other firms. The condition for this to happen for firm i is then
b ≤ (1 + s)λi
λ¯N
.
Thus, we have,
Lemma 2.1. Firm i will use NBF if and only if:
λ¯N
λi
≤ 1 + s
b
. (2.1)
Notice that 1+s
b
is the ratio between the yields of government bonds, which
also determines the banks lending rates and thus the cost of raising $1 liquidity
through a bank loan, and the cost of raising $1 liquidity through NBF. Obviously,
comparative statics of the above condition implies that a firm is more likely to
use NBF to solve its liquidity constraint, when the marginal cost of NBF b, is
low, or the interest rate charged by banks, s, is high. Moreover, the higher is
the quality of a firm, λi, the more likely it engages in NBF. This result comes
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with no surprise. With information asymmetry between banks and firms, banks
charge an interest rate according to the market average quality. As a result the
high quality borrowers subsidize the low quality borrowers in the pool of different
quality borrowers. Turning to NBF helps this high quality firms to escape to
subsidize the low quality firms.
3. Separation of the Financial and the Real Sector
In the previous section, we have shown that in a lemons lending market good
quality firms face higher borrowing costs than bad quality firms. As a result good
quality firms are more likely to look for other ways to solve their liquidity problems
(e.g. through NBF) than to borrow from banks. However, when better quality
firms look for other options than borrowing this will lower the average quality of
the pool of borrowing firms that come to the banks. This generates an externality
on the lending rates of banks. The cost of borrowing goes up which, in turn,
leads more good quality firms to turn away from banks. This logic repeats until
in equilibrium only the bad quality firms borrow from banks and the good quality
firms raise liquidity through NBF. As a result the financial sector is separated
from the real sector of the economy. In the following we show this separating
equilibrium formally.
First, we illustrate conditions for a separating equilibrium between the finan-
cial and real sector when s is exogenously given. We derive a separating equi-
librium with s being endogenized further down below. To make things simple,
we assume that λi = λi−1 − µ for all i = 1, 2, ..., N , and λN = µ. Under this
assumption, the average quality of all firms is
λN =
1
N
NX
i=1
λi =
(1 +N)µ
2
.
The firms’ quality can be ranked as λ1 > λ2 > ...λn−1 > λn > ... > λN . We assume
that the ranking is not known to any agent in the economy. Let us suppose that
λn satisfies the following condition,
λn−1 >
bλ¯N
1 + s
> λn.
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According to Lemma 1, this condition implies that firms with subscript i ≤ n− 1
will not borrow from banks because their cost of borrowing is too high. All other
firms with i ≥ n will find it cheaper to borrow from banks. Thus, at the starting
point the n− 1 high quality firms do not borrow from banks.
In the following lemma, we show for exogenously given s that when the bank
lending market is a lemons market, in equilibrium the higher the ratio 1+s
b
, the
fewer firms will borrow from banks.
Proposition 3.1. Lemma 3.2. There are three possible equilibria in a lemons
bank lending market:
Lemma 3.3. 1. if 1 ≤ 1+s
b
, the equilibrium is n∗ = N and no firm borrows
from banks; however,
2. if N+2
2(N+1)
≥ 1+s
b
, the equilibrium is n∗ = 0 and all firms borrow from banks;
finally,
3. if N+2
2(N+1)
< 1+s
b
< 1, there exists an equilibrium n∗ ∈ (0, N) such that all
firms with subscript i ≤ n∗ do not borrow, while all the remaining N − n∗
firms borrow from banks.
Proof. Given the quality rank of firms, λ1 > λ2 > ...λn−1 > λn > ... > λN ,
without loss of generality, let us start with firm n. This firm will borrow for given
λ¯N and s; but all n− 1 better quality firms do not borrow in the lending market.
However, the n− 1 firms’ withdrawal from the lending market lowers the average
quality of the remaining N − n+ 1 firms
λ¯N−n+1 =
1
N − n+ 1
N−n+1X
i=1
λi
=
(1 +N − n+ 1)µ
2
<
(1 +N)µ
2
= λN .
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The lower average quality of the pool of borrowing firms may make firm n decide
not to borrow. Given the quality of firm n
λn = (N − n+ 1)µ,
applying Lemma 1, the general condition for firm n not to borrow is λ¯N−n+1/λn ≤
1+s
b
, or
(1 +N − n+ 1)µ
2 (N − n+ 1)µ ≤
1 + s
b
.
Rewrite the above NBF condition as
ψ (n) =
b (N − n+ 2)
2 (N − n+ 1) − 1 ≤ s.
Where, the banking lemons market equation ψ (n) is defined as
ψ (n) ≡ b λ¯N−n+1
λn
− 1.
It is easy to see that ψ (n) is a convex increasing function of n with ψ (0) =
b(N+2)
2(N+1)
− 1 and ψ (N) = b − 1. Thus, if ψ (N) = b − 1 ≤ s, the equilibrium is
n∗ = N , i.e. no firm borrows.
Furthermore, if ψ (0) = b(N+2)
2(N+1)
− 1 ≥ s, by Lemma 1, all firms will borrow and
the equilibrium is n∗ = 0.
Finally, if ψ (0) = b(N+2)
2(N+1)
−1 < s and ψ (N) = b−1 > s, there exists n∗ ∈ (0, N)
that ψ (n∗) = s.
Concerning the stability of the equilibrium, it is easy to see that for any firm
i, where i ≤ n∗, ψ (i) < s (i). Thus, firm i will not borrow from banks which will
push more firms to choose not to borrow until i = n∗. Moreover, for any firm j,
where j > n∗, ψ (j) > s (j). Thus, firm j will borrow which pushes more firms to
choose to borrow until j = n∗. Thus, n∗ is a stable equilibrium.
So far we have assumed that the yields of government bonds s is exogenously
given. However, s will depend also on the number of NBF firms in the economy.
In the following, we endogenize the yields of government bonds s to make its value
15
depends on the number of NBF firms in the economy. Substituting s (n) into the
condition in Lemma 2, the no-borrow condition becomes
s (n) ≥ ψ (n) (3.1)
with
s (n) = φr0
µ
1 +
t
R−Ntn
¶
as the government securities yields equation; and
ψ (n) =
b (N − n+ 2)
2 (N − n+ 1) − 1
as the banking lemons market equation. The following proposition gives condi-
tions for a separating equilibrium in which the good quality firms do not borrow
from banks.15
Proposition 3.4. If (b− 1)
³
1− tN
R
´
> φro > b(N+2)2(N+1) − 1 a unique interior equi-
librium n∗ ∈ (0, N) , s∗ ∈
³
φro, φr0RR−Nt
´
exists such that n∗ better quality firms
do not borrow and the remaining N − n∗ low quality firms borrow from banks.
Moreover, the equilibrium value of n∗, s∗ increase with t,φro and decrease with
R.
Proof. Notice that s (n) is a linear upward sloping function with s (0) = φro,
and s (N) = φr0R
R−Nt . Moreover, ψ (n) is a convex upward sloping function with
ψ (0) = b(N+2)
2(N+1)
− 1, and ψ (N) = b− 1.
If s (0) > ψ (0) and s (N) < ψ (N) a unique interior equilibrium exists that
n∗ ∈ (0, N) and s∗ ∈ (s (0) , s (N)) . Rewriting s (N) = φr0R
R−Nt < ψ (N) = b − 1
as (b− 1)
³
1− tN
R
´
> φro = s (0) and combining with s (0) > ψ (0) we have the
conditions stated in the proposition.
Intuitively, when the number of NBF firms increases, the government’s tax
revenue T declines, which in turn pushes up the yields of government bonds, s.
15The result shows only the case that is most relevant to our evidence. A full characterization
of the equilibria of the model is available upon request.
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This, in turn, may lead more firms not to borrow from banks. The switching from
borrowing to NBF will generate a negative externality on other borrowing firms
who may stop borrowing as well. As a consequence s is pushed further up which
will again induce more firms not to borrow. This cycle repeats until s is too high
to attract more borrowers; or the borrowing firms are of too poor a quality to
switch to NBF.
Concerning the stability of the equilibrium (n∗, s∗), it is easy to see that for
any firm i, where i ≤ n∗, ψ (i) < s (i). Thus, firm i will not borrow from banks
pushing up s and leading more firms to choose not to borrow. This makes ψ (i)
increase faster than s (i) until i = n∗. Moreover, for any firm j, where j > n∗,
ψ (j) > s (j). Thus, firm j will borrow pushing down s and leading more firms to
choose to borrow. This makes ψ (i) decrease faster than s (i) until j = n∗. Thus,
(n∗, s∗) is a stable equilibrium. Given that s (n) increases (decreases) with t,φro
(R), the comparative static results follow.
The above result illustrates a banking development trap. Banks invest in
financial assets, such as government bonds. Firms are squeezed out from the
financial sector and only bad quality firms rely on bank loans. Firms, in particular
good ones, solve their liquidity problems through NBF. The economy is stuck in a
separation between the real sector and the banking sector — a banking development
trap.
Our separation result between the real and the banking sector is substan-
tially different from a conventional ‘government crowding out’ story. To illustrate
the importance of the lemons lending bank market we calibrate the model with
data from Russia in 1997 before the August financial crisis has hit the eocnomy.
The following example demonstrates how the degree of information asymmetry
between banks and firms worsens the separation between the two sectors.
For the simulation we choose the following parameters. To approximate the
benchmark banks lending rates r in our model we use the commercial banks
lending rates of the Czech republic as a transition country with an established
banking sector. The lending rates were 13.2% in 1997 and 8.7% in 1999. Thus
we select 10% for r. Total government expenditeure in percent of GDP in Russia
is 18.4% in 1997. Thus we choose 18% for R. Since planned tax revenue T is not
observable we assume a value of 10 for T.
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Example 3.5. The Role of Information Asymmetry: We consider two eco-
nomies which differ in the degree of information asymmetry between banks and
firms but share all other parameter values with r = 0.10, φ = 1.5, b = 2.1, R = 18,
T = 10.We capture the degree of information asymmetry in the two countries by
the number of firms in the real sector of the economy N. The idea is that the
larger the number of firms in the economy the more heterogenous their quality
increasing the information problem that banks face.
Case 1: Moderate degree of information asymmetry: N = 10. Graph 1 gives
the resulting banking lemons market curve ψ (n) and the government securities
yields line s (n). The intersection of the two curves gives the equilibrium at point
T at which 61 percent of the firms do not borrow from banks and the government
security rate s settles at 26 percent. In Russia in 1997 more than 50 percent of
firms’ sales were financed by other firms in the form of barter transactions and
the treasury bills market rate reached 28 percent (see Figures 1 to 3). Thus, for
reasonable parameter values the model is quite consistent with the data for Russia
in 1997.
Case 2: High degree of information asymmetry: N = 160. Graph 2 gives
the corresponding ψ (n) curve and s (n) line. At the new equilibrium at point
T 98 percent of the firms are involved in NBF and the treasury bill rate reaches
33.4 percent.
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The example illustrates that an economy with a higher degree of information
asymmetry suffers from a stronger separation between the real sector and the
banking sector. A conventional crowding out story would not depend on the
degree of information asymmetry between banks and firms as is the case here.
4. Financial Crisis and Banking Development
In the previous section we have derived an equilibrium in which the financial sector
is separated from the real sector and the yields of government securities s are high.
In this section we analyze how an exogenous shock in the agents confidence in the
government which is triggered by the government’s default and the firesale of
government securities will affect an economy with a separated financial and real
sector.
A negative confidence shock leads to a major drop in φ and with it in the yields
of government securities s.16 As a result, the banks which are heavily invested in
government securities will suffer major losses. The direct effect of such a financial
crisis on the real sector is, however, limited when the two sectors are separated.
16To make the model simple, we choose to treat the financial crisis as an exogenous event.
Our analysis focuses on the consequences of a financial crisis.
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Corollary 4.1. With the separation between the banking sector and the real
sector, the plunge of φ has no direct impact on the number of good quality firms
n∗ which do not borrow from banks, although banks may make losses.
Typically, a financial crisis leads to a sharp fall in output in economies expieri-
encing such crisis. Furthermore, output recovers only slowly after a crisis hits.17
In an economy in which the financial and the real sector are separated, a financial
crisis may, in fact, be beneficial for the recovery of output. When φ and s plunge,
banks’ options outside of the real sector disappear. This induces banks to lower
lending rates to attract more firms. As a result, some better quality firms will
switch to borrow from banks which improves the average quality of the borrow-
ing pool. The improved quality of the borrowing pool will further lower bank
lending rates inducing more firms to borrow. Moreover, when more firms borrow,
tax revenue T goes up. This reduces government borrowing, which leads to a
further drop in s . This logic leads to a new equilibrium in which better quality
firms borrow from banks; loan interest rates go down; and banks invest less in
government securities. The ‘separation’ syndrome may disappear if the shock is
sufficiently strong.
Starting from an economy where n∗ good quality firms do not borrow from
banks, we show now that the banking sector connects with the real sector when
φ drops.
Proposition 4.2. If the banking sector is separated from the real sector in an
economy, a financial crisis caused by a plunge of φ may lead to an integration of
the two sectors. In the new equilibrium, the ‘separation’ syndrome may diminish
or even disappear.
Proof. We are going to show two possible cases when φ is reduced to φ0. Notice
that ψ (n) is independent from φ; and further notice that s (n) is a linear increasing
function of φ.
17see footnote 5.
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1. If φ0 is reduced moderately a unique stable interior equilibrium nc ∈ (0, n∗)
exists such that nc firms barter trade and the number of bartering firms is
reduced. This is because with a lower φ0 that
φ0ro >
b (N + 2)
2 (N + 1)
− 1.
Applying Proposition 1 we have the result.
2. If φ0 is reduced substantially then in equilibrium nc = 0, i.e. all firms borrow.
This is because with a drastic reduction of φ to φ0 that
φ0ro
R
R− tN <
b (N + 2)
2 (N + 1)
− 1
which implies s (N) < ψ (0) , then in equilibrium nc = 0.
Intuitively, when the exogenous shock is sufficiently big, a financial crisis may
destroy banks opportunities in trading government bonds. By knocking out this
‘outside option’ banks are lured to lend to the real sector which drives the economy
out of the banking failure trap. Moreover, it provides conditions for banking
development as banks invest more in the real sector rather than in government
bonds.
Our results describe well what has happened in Russia. The financial crisis
in Russia was triggered by the default of the government in the bond market.
Investors lost their confidence in government securities leading to a collapse of
the treasury bill market. Banks made big losses from trading government bonds
inducing them to look for new opportunities to lend and to make money. Indeed,
comparing bank lending to the private sector in 1997, the year before the financial
crisis, with that in 2000, reveals an increase in bank lending in Russia and in
Ukraine from 8 percent and 2 percent of GDP, respectively, to 12 percent and 9
percent of GDP, respectively, while barter trade delined by about 30 percent.
It is important to point out that although the financial crisis may destroy the
bad equilibrium of a banking failure trap and may thus provide an opportunity
for banking development, this is by no means guaranteed. This is because infor-
mation asymmetry is the key factor which causes the separation between the real
sector and the banking sector. As long as information asymmetry between banks
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and firms is severe, a financial crisis may not be able to act as a trigger to pull
the economy out of a banking development trap. Indeed, the following example
illustrates that when the degree of information asymmetry is large enough, the
lemons market problem is so serious that a financial shock is not enough to pull
the economy out of a banking development trap.
Example 4.3. The Effectiveness of Financial Crisis for Banking Devel-
opment: The Role of Information Asymmetry. We look at two economies
with the same parameter values given by r = 0.10, b = 2.1, T = 10, R = 18.
The initial value of confidence into government securities is the same, φ = 1.8.
The only difference between the two economies is assumed to be the degree of
information asymmetry.
Case 3: Moderate degree of information asymmetry: N = 10. Graph 3 gives
the ψ (n) curve and the lines s (n) and s0 (n) before and after, respectively the
financial crisis hits the economy. Before the shock (which is captured by a drop
in φ from 1.8 to 1.2) the equilibrium settles at point T at which 74 percent of the
firms are involved in NBF with a government security rate of 34.8 percent. After
the shock (a drop in φ to 1.2), in the new equilibrium no firm engages in NBF
and the treasury bill rate is 12 percent.
Case 4: High degree of information asymmetry: N = 160. Graph 4 gives the
ψ (n) curve with three lines before the financial shock s (n), after a moderate
financial shock s0 (n) , and finally after a drastic financial shock s00 (n) . Before the
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shock, the economy settles at an equilibrium T at which 98.8 percent of the firms
engage in NBF and the government security rate is 40 percent. With the same
moderate shock as in Graph 3 (captured by a drop in φ from 1.8 to 1.2) the new
equilibrium at T’ still gives 97.6 percent of firms involved in NBF and a treasury
bill rate of 12.1 percent. Only with a drastic drop of φ from 1.8 to 0.3 is the NBF
economy removed and no firm barter trades with a government security rate of 3
percent.
The example illustrates that a small financial shock is sufficient to bring an
economy out from the separation between the real sector and the banking sector
if the degree of information asymmetry is low. However, a large shock is required
to do the same for an economy with a high degree of information asymmetry.
The example demonstrates how the financial shock interacts with the degree of
information asymmetry and thus highlights the relative importance of each for
bank development.
5. Empirical Evidence
5.1. Firm Level Evidence
In this section we examine the predictions from our model with data of about 100
firms who engaged in barter trade in Ukraine in 1997. We interviewed 55 firms
to obtain information on 165 barter deals. Each firm provided us with 3 barter
23
deals. Each barter deal involved 2 firms, a seller and a buyer. Many of the firms
were well informed about the financial and economic conditions of the firms they
traded with because they served as financiers. This is how we obtained firm level
information for about 100 firms (depending on the variable). Table 4 and Table
6 take a first look at the data and give descriptive statistics of the variables used
in the empirical analysis.18
Our model predicts that low quality firms will predominantly finance their
production with bank loans. We examine the relationship between bank lending
and the characteristics of firms in Table 5. In the table we run the regressions
for all firms in the sample (first five columns) and then for firms with positive
bank debt only. We use the firms’ bank debt in percent of sales DEBT as the
dependent variable. 62 percent of the firms have positive bank debt with an
average ratio of bank debt to firms sales of 6.3 percent (see Table 6). As a
measure for the firms’ quality λi we use the variable QUALITY, which is defined
by the firms’ productivity. Another aspect of the firms’ quality is captured by
firms’ arrears in percent of sales, and we denote this measurement by ARREARS.
The more indebted the firm is vis-a-vis other firms the less likely it is that the
firm will be able to repay its bank loans and thus the larger the banks’ credit risk.
Thus, our theory predicts a positive sign on the ARREARS variable. Turning to
the results it appears that QUALITY is significant and negative and ARREARS
is significant and positive in all specifications. ARREARS and QUALITY, both
measuring the firms’quality appear to be correlated (when ARREARS is included,
QUALITY becomes insignificant). Therefore, we excluded ARREARS in the
remaining specifications shown in columns 4 and 5.
Next, we include BARTCOST and TOT as variables capturing the cost of
barter trade b. BARTCOST is an index which takes the value of zero if the firms
output is produced with only one input and approaches one when the firm uses
several inputs from other sectors. We use BARTCOST here as a measure of the
cost of raising liquidity via barter. When a firm trades in many inputs it will have
more leverage in barter trading between varieties of goods and thus will have lower
bartering cost. We expect a negative coefficient on BARTCOST.19 Turning to the
18For a more detailed description of the data sample see Marin, Kaufmann, Gorochowksij
(2000).
19Blanchard and Kremer (1997) use the same variable as a measure for the hold-up problems
of firms. The larger the number of inputs used for production the more complex the production
and the more bargaining problems arise. In their theory of barter Marin and Schnitzer (1999)
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results BARTCOST is negative and significant suggesting that firms with higher
barter costs borrow more from banks.
Finally, we include the variable TOT into the regression which captures the
terms of trade effect of barter. We will use it here as a measure for the credit costs
of barter. TOT measures in percent the extend to which barter shifts the terms
of trade in favor of the firm extending a trade credit within barter. The larger the
shift in the terms of trade the more costly it is to raise liquidity via barter trade.
For given costs for bank loans an increase in the credit costs of barter induces
firms to switch to bank loans to solve their liquidity needs and thus we expect
a positive sign on the TOT variable. TOT turns out to be positive and highly
significant at conventional levels.
Lastly, we introduce the variables STATED and EMPLOY to control for own-
ership and firm size. One possible reason why the bad quality firms receive more
bank loans than other firms is that the bad firms may be state owned and/or large.
State owned firms or large firms may have better creditworthiness because of the
expectation of a state bail out. It turns out, however, that neither STATED nor
EMPLOY are significant at conventional levels in the all firms regressions. In the
regressions for firms with positive bank debt (last five columns) STATED is not
significant and firm size appears to hinder the firm to get loans (the relationship
is significant and negative). The variable GROWTH is the firms’ output growth
relative to GDP growth in Ukraine between 1994 and 1996 and is supposed to
control for the fact that firms with access to bank loans can grow faster. The
relationship is strong and highly significant.
suggest lower bartering costs for firms with more complex production. They argue that barter
trade helps firms to deal with the hold-up problem.
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Table 4
0 - 105 0 0 - 10 10 - 105
100% 38% 52% 10%
mean 19490 23269 18168 12000
Anova: F-test 1,30
sign. level (0,276)
mean 0,802 0,823 0,800 0,752
Anova:F-test 2,13
sign. level (0,123)
mean 0,03 -1,23 0,17 4,08
Anova:F-test 10,53
sign. level (0,000)
mean 4,55 2,79 4,10 13,53
Anova:F-test 2,02
sign. level (0,136)
mean 30,1 16,9 17,2 137,0
Anova:F-test 13,81
sign. level (0,000)
mean 4679,9 1121,3 7222,5 4981,4
Anova:F-test 1,85
sign. level (0,162)
Source: Data Sample of 165 Barter Deals in Ukraine in 1997 
QUALITY
BARTCOST
Bank Lending and Firm Characteristics
bank debt in percent of sales
GROWTH
TOT
ARREARS
EMPLOY
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Table 6
Standard Number of
 Deviation observations
QUALITY 19481,9 26109,9 1565,8 135133,3 152
BARTCOST 0,80 0,12 0,34 0,92 141
GROWTH 0,01 4,21 -2,03 25,43 153
TOT 4,59 18,07 -168,00 50,00 163
ARREARS 30,15 90,89 0,70 626,00 138
EMPLOY 4386,6 17518,1 8 130000 165
BANK DEBT 6,31 15,96 0 104,20 150
STATED 
Source: Data Sample of 165 Barter Deals in Ukraine in 1997 
Variable
Descriptive Statistics
D = 1 ,     43 observations
Minimum MaximumMean
5.2. Cross Country Evidence
In this section we examine the prediction of the model that a financial crisis may
trigger a change that can substantially improve conditions for banking develop-
ment. We will use country level data for 20 transition economies. Russia and
Ukraine are among the transition countries with the most underdeveloped finan-
cial system. Our firm level evidence for Ukraine presented in the previous section
suggests a separation between the real and financial sector in which bad quality
firms only come to banks to raise liquidity. In this section we look for comparative
evidence on the determination of bank intermediation at the macro level across
transition countries. Our theory predicts that a country’s level of bank intermedi-
ation is driven by the extent of information asymmetry between banks and firms,
by the level of the government budget deficit, and by the level of barter trade.
The governement’s budget deficit induces banks to invest their excess liquidity
in government securities which crowds out bank lending to the real sector of the
28
economy. Barter trade leads banks to charge high interest rates so that they end
up lending little to firms.
We start by examining commercial banks’ lending rates. We expect that
economies with a larger degree of information asymmetry between banks and
firms, with a larger size of government deficit, and with a larger share of barter
trade to have higher commercial banks’ interest rates. We use commercial banks’
3-months lending rates as the dependent variable. We measure the degree of infor-
mation asymmetry between banks and firms by the country’s EXPORT SHARE
and/or by incoming foreign direct investment as a share of GDP FDI/GDP. Both
variables are supposed to capture the average credit risk of the real sector. The
idea is that the larger the export share and the larger the share of incoming for-
eign direct investment in percent of GDP the better the quality of the real sector
and thus the lower the interest rates that banks will charge. In a market with
credit rationing as we describe it here commercial banks lending rates are not
driven by supply and demand but rather by the average credit risk of the pool of
borrowing firms. Turning to the results in Table 7 this turns out to be the case,
since both variables are negative and significant in the majority of specifications.
The variables GOVDEBT and GOVDEF are both measures for the government’s
soft budget constraint. The former is the government’s debt outstanding and the
latter is the government’s deficit both in percent of GDP. Lending rates will as
well be affected by yields of government securities given the possibility for banks
to invest in securities.20 As expected GOVDEBT or GOVDEF have both a posi-
tive and significant influence on interest rates except when the variable FDI/GDP
(Stock) is included in the regression. The variable BARTER measures the share
of barter in percent of sales in transition countries. As predicted the variable
tends to increase banks’ lending rates. Finally, we include the EBRD index of
commercial law LEGAL to control for differences in the legal environment across
transition countries. Not surprisingly, improvements in the effectiveness of the
legal system tends to lower interest rates.
20In Russia the government offered exceptionally high yields on government bonds to make
it attractive for banks to invest. In 1996 Russia was among the transition countries with the
highest spread between bank loan and deposit rates. Our model suggests that bank loan rates
are driven by the yields of government securities which may explain why the spread in Russia
is particular wide. For the spreads in the banking sector in transition countries, see Transition
Report 1998.
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Next, we turn to analyse the level of bank intermediation across transition
economies. Here we use as the dependent variable a country’s level of bank credit
to the private sector in percent of GDP. We want to test whether countries with
a larger degree of information asymmetry between banks and firms, with a larger
share of barter in their economy, and with a larger government budget deficit
have a lower level of bank intermediation. Table 8 gives the results. As core
variables we use the same variables as before in Table 7 explaining commercial
banks’ lending rates. We find that the variables EXPORT SHARE and FDI/GDP
capturing the average credit risk of a country’s real sector are both positive and
significant at conventional levels suggesting that the lower the credit risk (the
larger EXPORT SHARE and FDI/GDP), the more banks lend to the private
sector. The variables GOVDEBT and GOVDEF as measures for the size of the
government sector are both not significant (except for one specification) suggesting
that the size of the government budget has no extra effect on the level of bank
lending which works beyond the channel of banks’ lending rates (in Table 7 we
found that these variables tend to increase banks’ lending rates). In specification 4
of Table 8 we include BARTER (and exclude GOVDEBT and GOVDEF because
they tend to be correlated with BARTER21) and find as predicted that the larger
a country’s exposure to the non-cash economy the lower its level of bank lending
to the private sector.
Furthermore, we include the EBRD index for non-banking financial institu-
tions reform FINREG to control for differences in banking reform across transition
countries. The index goes from 1 to 4, the larger the number, the more reform
has been undertaken in the country. We use the index for non-bank financial
institutions as a proxy for bank reform rather than the index for banking reform
itself to avoid problems of multicollinearity in the regression. Not surprising, the
level of bank intermediation tends to increase in the countries with more progress
in banking reform.
21Our model predicts that BARTER and GOVDEF will be correlated. The larger the budget
deficit the larger the yields of government bonds and banks interest rates and thus the less
attractive it is for firms to borrow from banks. They switch to barter instead. Furthermore, the
more firms barter, the smaller will be the government’s tax revenues, because firms will tend to
exploit the possibility to evade taxes when bartering.
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We turn to the post financial crisis year of 1999 to see whether the financial
crisis has changed the lending behavior of banks. This is done in columns (8) to
(11) of Tables 7 and in columns (6) to (10) of Table 8. Four things are notewor-
thy from the tables. First, the two variables capturing the average credit risk of
the producing sector EXPORT SHARE and FDI/GDP stop to have a significant
influence on interest rates (Table 7) as well as on bank lending to the real sec-
tor (Table 8). Second, the effect of GOVDEF and GOVDEBT on lending rates
becomes insignificant while GOVDEF has now in 1999 a marginally significant
influence on bank lending to the privat sector. Apparently, the strong reduction
in the fiscal budget deficit after the financial crisis has boosted bank lending to
the private sector which has gone beyond its effect on lending rates. Third, barter
stops to have a significant influence on interest rates as well as on bank lending.
To conclude, the drastic changes in the results of the regressions explaining
interest rates and bank lending behaviour before and after the financial crisis do
seem to suggest that the financial crisis has changed the behaviour of the banking
sector in a fundamental way. The banking sector appears to connect with the
real sector. This makes it possible for many transition countries, most notable for
Russia and Ukraine, to abandon barter trade and to return to the cash economy.
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6. Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper offers a model which explains why the financial sector is separated
from the real sector in the economies of Russia and Ukraine. We argue that
before the financial crisis of 1998 the economies of Russia and Ukraine were stuck
in a banking development trap due to firms incentives to raise liquidity through
barter trade. The large government deficit resulted in high yields of government
bonds which induced banks to invest in treasury bills rather than to lend to firms.
The financial crisis in 1998 reversed this process and acted as a trigger to get
out of this trap. This has led to a strong economic recovery, to a decline of
barter trade, and provided initial conditions for banking development. Whether
economic recovery and growth can continue critically depends on whether the
conditions for banking development can be sustained.
Our model has several policy implications of how the conditions for banking
development can remain favourable. The highest priority has fiscal policy. It is
critical that the government hardens its budget constraint and avoids to create
an environment in which banks prefer to invest in government bonds rather than
to lend to firms. The economic recovery has provided the conditions for this to
happen, since in 1999 the government balance turned into a surplus in Russia
as well as in Ukraine. Furthermore, our model suggest that in order to sustain
banking development the banks’ relative rate of return of lending to the firms in
the real sector has to be kept high. Thus, in the first stage of bank development
a moderate amount of competition in the banking sector is desirable. If bank
competition is too strong, it will be difficult to maintain the incentives of banks to
lend to the real sector and to invest in evaluating credit risk. If bank competition
is too weak, then monopolistic banks will charge excessively high interest rates
which will make firms turn back to barter trade.
Finally, our model suggests that a financial crisis, though viewed by many as
a bad thing, can have its benefits as well. One of the benefits highlighted in this
paper is that the crisis can lead an economy out of the banking development trap
and to set the stage and initial conditions for financial development. This way
the financial crisis has helped these economies to start to escape the non cash
economy.
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